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Stress may promote the onset of psychopathology by disrupting reward processing.
However, the extent to which stress impairs reward processing, rather than incentive
processing more generally, is unclear. To evaluate the specificity of stress-induced
reward processing disruption, 100 psychiatrically healthy females were administered a
probabilistic stimulus selection task (PSST) that enabled comparison of sensitivity to
reward-driven (Go) and punishment-driven (NoGo) learning under either “no stress”
or “stress” (threat-of-shock) conditions. Cortisol samples and self-report measures
were collected. Contrary to hypotheses, the groups did not differ significantly in task
performance or cortisol reactivity. However, further analyses focusing only on individuals
under “stress” who were high responders with regard to both cortisol reactivity and
self-reported negative affect revealed reduced reward sensitivity relative to individuals
tested in the “no stress” condition; importantly, these deficits were reward-specific.
Overall, findings provide preliminary evidence that stress-reactive individuals show
diminished sensitivity to reward, but not punishment, under stress. While such results
highlight the possibility that stress-induced anhedonia might be an important mechanism
linking stress to affective disorders, future studies are necessary to confirm this
conjecture.
Keywords: affect-cognition interactions, stress, anhedonia, reward, punishment, cortisol, depression, emotion
INTRODUCTION
Unraveling the connection between life stress and the onset
of affective disorders continues to be a critical but complex
endeavor. The reward system is often dysfunctional in affective
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and may play
a central role in bridging these phenomena. Specifically, mount-
ing evidence suggests that stress attenuates reward responsiveness
through its influence on underlying neurobiological processes
(Anisman and Matheson, 2005). However, a central point of
ambiguity in this domain concerns the specificity of the impact
of stress on reward processing. In order to gain a more compre-
hensive understanding of the mechanisms at play, it is necessary
to clarify whether such effects might be generalizable to other
valence-laden stimuli (e.g., punishment) and thus reflective of
incentive processing more broadly.
A large body of preclinical work suggests that uncontrol-
lable negative stressors blunt sensitivity to reward via disruption
of mesocorticolimbic pathways. The majority of research inves-
tigating relationships between stressors and reward processing
has been performed in non-human animal studies. In rodents,
uncontrollable stress leads to “anhedonic” behavior and dysfunc-
tion within mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic pathways critically
implicated in incentive motivation and hedonic coding (Anisman
and Matheson, 2005; Henn and Vollmayr, 2005). Surprisingly,
relatively few researchers have empirically examined putative rela-
tionships between stress and the reward system in humans. In
an early human study, Berenbaum and Connelly (1993) found
that real-life acute stressors, including military training and final
examinations, reduced self-reported pleasure and positive affect
in two separate samples. Moreover, this stress-induced reduction
in hedonic capacity was strongest in participants with family his-
tories of depression. In a controlled laboratory setting, Bogdan
and Pizzagalli (2006) reported that an acute stressor (threat-
of-shock) blunted reward responsiveness—specifically, partici-
pants’ ability to modulate behavior as a function of rewards
(see Bogdan et al., 2011 and Liu et al., 2011 for indepen-
dent replications). Using the same probabilistic reward task,
participants with high levels of perceived life stress were char-
acterized by decreased reward responsiveness (Pizzagalli et al.,
2007). Recently, Cavanagh and colleagues (2010) employed a
social evaluative stress manipulation while participants com-
pleted a probabilistic stimulus selection task (PSST). They
found that stress led to relatively decreased reward learning
in individuals with high trait-level punishment sensitivity [as
assessed using the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) scale] as
compared to an enhanced reward learning bias in individuals
with lower trait-level punishment sensitivity. Complementing
these behavioral findings, two recent neuroimaging studies
reported that stress inductions (e.g., cold pressor task, aver-
sive movie clips) superimposed on reward processing paradigms
reduced activity in brain areas involved in reward process-
ing, including the medial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex,
and dorsal striatum (Ossewaarde et al., 2011; Porcelli et al.,
2012).
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In spite of these findings, it remains unclear whether such
stress-induced effects are specific to rewards or extend to
negatively-valenced stimuli, such as punishment. In Cavanagh’s
aforementioned study (2010), social evaluative stress led to
heightened sensitivity to punishment in individuals with high
trait-level punishment sensitivity, but lower sensitivity to punish-
ment in individuals with low trait-level punishment sensitivity.
In related research, various prior studies have examined aver-
sive processing changes using threat of shock manipulations
and report stress-induced increases in aversive processing during
affective Stroop tasks (e.g., Edwards et al., 2006, 2010; Robinson
et al., 2011). In a recent fMRI study investigating the neural cir-
cuitry underlying such findings, Robinson and colleagues (2012)
reported that enhanced dorsomedial prefrontal cortex amygdala
connectivity during the processing of aversive stimuli under stress
(threat of unpredictable foot shock in the scanner) might under-
lie stress-induced threat biases. Collectively, these studies raise the
possibility that, unlike reward sensitivity, punishment sensitivity
might be potentiated under stress.
The current study was designed to assess the specificity of the
deleterious effect of stress on reward processing by comparing
the impact of stress on reward-related (e.g., positive feedback) vs.
punishment-related (e.g., negative feedback) learning. To achieve
this aim, a PSST (modified from Frank et al., 2004) was imple-
mented in conjunction with an acute stressor (threat-of-shock)
using a between-subjects design (e.g., “stress” vs. “no-stress”).
The current study design differed from previous studies in this
area (e.g., Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006; Bogdan et al., 2011)
because it allowed evaluation of responsiveness to both positive
and negative feedback. This enabled us to ascertain whether pur-
ported stress-induced reward processing deficits reflected specific
reductions in sensitivity to reward feedback vs. broad reductions
in sensitivity to feedback in general (regardless of valence). In
addition, our experiment was initially designed to test whether
the impact of stress on reward processing was conditional upon
the stressor being perceived as uncontrollable. This was attempted
by implementing both a “controllable” and “uncontrollable”
stress condition, along with a “no stress” condition. However, this
aspect of our stress manipulation was unsuccessful (see Appendix
for detailed analyses) and thus the present report focuses on the
comparison between “stress” (collapsed across the two control-
lability subgroups) and “no-stress” conditions. Based on prior
findings, we hypothesized that individuals under acute stress
would exhibit reduced reward sensitivity (e.g., lower reward-
related accuracy and a reduced reward-related RT bias, as detailed
in the Materials and Methods section) relative to individuals in
the no-stress condition. Moreover, we hypothesized that reward
sensitivity would be selectively more reduced relative to punish-




All study procedures were approved by Harvard University’s
Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research. One
hundred (n = 100) female participants, 18–25 years old, were
recruited through community advertisements and the Harvard
University Department of Psychology Study Pool. Only females
were recruited due to sex differences in psychological and
hormonal responses to stress, and because women tend to
demonstrate a more pronounced stress response than men
(Nolen-Hoeksema and Hilt, 2009). All subjects were right-
handed, non-smokers, with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, no color-blindness, and no known current or past neu-
rological, psychiatric or medical illnesses. Prior to participation,
all individuals were screened over the phone to determine study
eligibility. The evaluation included diagnostic screening ques-
tions from the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis
I Disorders (SCID; First et al., 1995), more detailed questions
from the depression and substance abuse modules, and a hand-
edness questionnaire (Chapman and Chapman, 1987). Subjects
were excluded if they could speak or read Japanese because one
of the tasks (PSST) included Hiragana symbols. Individuals who
met eligibility requirements were invited for an experimental ses-
sion. Prior to the session, participants were randomized to one
of three experimental conditions: “no stress” (n = 29), “con-
trollable stress” (n = 35), or “uncontrollable stress” (n = 36).
Data from five participants (two from the “no stress” group,
one from the “controllable stress” group and two from the
“uncontrollable stress” group) were excluded because they never
met performance criteria [see Modified Probabilistic Stimulus
Selection Task (PSST) section] in the training phase of the
PSST. Thus, 95 participants were included in the analyses: “no
stress” group (n = 27), “controllable stress” group (n = 34), and
“uncontrollable stress” group (n = 34). However, given the lack
of success of the controllability aspect of our stress manipula-
tion (see Appendix for detailed analyses), data from the two stress
groups were combined into a single “stress” group in subsequent
analyses.
PROCEDURES
Figure 1 presents a summary of the session timeline. After arriv-
ing to the laboratory, the first written informed consent was
obtained using a general consent form with no mention of
the stress manipulation. This procedure allowed us to obtain
unbiased baseline self-report ratings and physiological indices.
Participants were then asked to complete a battery of self-
report questionnaires, including a demographics form, the Beck
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996), theMood and
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ-short; Watson et al.,
1995), the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen et al., 1983), the
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS; Gard et al., 2006),
and the Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales
(BIS/BAS; Carver andWhite, 1994).
Twenty minutes after arrival, the first of three saliva samples
was collected to measure baseline cortisol levels. Next, partici-
pants completed the first set of “in-the-moment” state self-report
questionnaires to obtain baseline ratings of their current mood
(=“baseline” timepoint for analyses). These included the state
versions of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S; Spielberger
et al., 1983) and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS-S; Watson et al., 1988).
Next, the second written informed consent was obtained using
either a “no stress” condition or a “stress” condition consent
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the session timeline. CORT, collection of saliva sample to measure cortisol level; MSQ, mood state questionnaires
(“in-the-moment” state self-report questionnaires); PSST, Probabilistic Stimulus Selection Task.
form. The “stress” consent form stated that participants might
receive electrical shocks (via two electrodes attached to their right
hand) during two ensuing computer games: “up to two” shocks
during the first task (a “filler” task) and “up to three” shocks dur-
ing the second task (the PSST). Participants then completed a
computerized basic attention task that acted as a “filler” task, dur-
ing which all participants in the “stress” condition received one
electrical shock (performance in this task was extraneous to study
hypotheses). This task served the purpose of making the potential
for shock a credible threat given that we did not actually adminis-
ter any shock during the main task of interest (PSST). Following
the “filler” task, participants completed a second identical set of
“in-the-moment” state self-report questionnaires (=“post-filler-
task/pre-PSST” timepoint); additionally, participants were asked
to provide a second saliva sample for cortisol level analyses
(approximately 13min after the shock).
Thereafter, participants who completed the “filler” task in
the “stress” condition were further subdivided into “control-
lable stress” and “uncontrollable stress” conditions, and partic-
ipants received the appropriate set of instructions for the PSST.
Between the training and test phases of the PSST, participants
completed a third set of “in-the-moment” state self-report ques-
tionnaires (=“PSST” timepoint) probing affect experienced dur-
ing the training phase of the task (i.e., the phase of the task
involving the stress manipulation). Following the test phase of
the PSST, participants were asked to provide a third saliva sam-
ple for cortisol analyses (time-locked to 10min from the end
of the training phase of the PSST in order to capture cortisol
levels when participants in the stress conditions were under per-
ceived “threat of shock”). Then, they completed a final set of
“in-the-moment” state self-report questionnaires (=“post-task”
timepoint). Participants also completed a post-task questionnaire
to probe their experiences during the session. At the end of
the experiment, all participants were debriefed and either paid
($10/h) or awarded study credit for their time. The overall session
took approximately 1.5–2 h, and subjects received $15–20 or
1.5–2 study credits. Please see Appendix for detailed descriptions
of trait and state measures.
Stress manipulation
Two electrodes were placed on the right hand of each partici-
pant assigned to either of the stress conditions, and the electrode
wires were attached to a shock box placed on the table in front of
the participant. The shock level was adjusted to what each par-
ticipant felt was “aversive, but not painful.” This was done by
beginning at the lowest level of shock intensity and having the
participant experience a brief shock at each level to have the par-
ticipant identify a level that she felt was “aversive, but not painful.”
The maximum current intensity (4mA; Coulbourn E13–22) was
approved by the local IRB. Prior to the “filler” task, these par-
ticipants were told that they could receive up to two electrical
shocks, but the task was actually programmed to administer only
one shock. In the PSST, all participants were told they would see
a multicolored bar on either side of the computer screen with a
tick mark that would periodically move up and down. In the “no
stress” condition, they were told that the bars had no meaning.
They were also told that occasionally the border of the com-
puter screen would flash red and they should press down on a
foot pedal when they saw this visual cue in order to indicate that
they were attending to the task. The task was programmed for
the cue to appear 1–2 times during each practice block, but par-
ticipants were not given information about the frequency of this
occurrence. For participants in both the “controllable stress” and
“uncontrollable stress” conditions, the border flashing red indi-
cated that a shock might occur in the next 15–30 s and they were
told that the location of the tick mark within the multicolored
bars would indicate the likelihood they would receive a shock.
For these participants, the multicolored bars were labeled with
“danger” at the top and “safe” at the bottom, and the closer the
tick mark was to the top of the bar, the higher the likelihood of
receiving a shock. Moreover, participants in the stress conditions
were told that the movement of the tick mark was determined
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by the computer and was unrelated to their performance on the
task. However, participants in the “controllable stress” condi-
tion were told that pressing the foot pedal when they saw the
red border visual cue would override the computer and lower
the location of the tick mark in the bars, thus reducing (albeit
not fully eliminating) the likelihood they would receive a shock.
When these participants pressed down on the foot pedal, the
tick mark did shift down closer to the “safe” zone at the bottom
of the bar, providing some visual feedback. In contrast, partic-
ipants in the “uncontrollable stress” condition were instructed
to press down on the foot pedal to indicate they were attending
to the task (i.e., they received the same instructions about the
foot pedal as those in the “no stress” condition) and this had
no effect on the location of the tick mark. Participants in both
stress conditions were told they could receive up to three electri-
cal shocks during the PSST; in reality, no shock was administered
during this task. Of note, the threat-of-shock stress manipula-
tion was only in effect during the training phase of the PSST.
This was the target of our stress manipulation because reward
and punishment feedback were only provided during that phase
of the task.
“Filler” task
Participants completed a brief version (∼8min) of a Continuous
Performance Task (CPT; Conners, 1995) as a “filler” task. They
were presented with a series of letters (“O,” “T,” “H,” “Z,” or “X”)
on a computer screen, one at a time, and were instructed to press
the space bar immediately following any letter except for “X.”
Participants completed two blocks of 125 trials, with each let-
ter appearing in 25 trials; on each trial, the letter stimulus was
presented for 500ms, followed by an interstimulus interval that
varied between 1250–1550ms.
Modified probabilistic stimulus selection task (PSST)
The PSST included a training phase and a test phase (Figure 2).
During the training phase, participants were presented with three
different stimuli pairs (AB, CD, EF) in random order, and were
instructed to choose one of the two stimuli by pressing one of
two response buttons. Following a subject’s response, feedback
was given to indicate whether the choice was “correct” or “incor-
rect.” Importantly, this feedback was probabilistic, such that for
AB trials, a choice of stimulus A led to correct (positive) feedback
in 80% of the trials, while a choice of stimulus B led to incorrect
(negative) feedback in these trials (with the relations reversed for
the other 20% of AB trials). The stimulus pair CDwas less reliable,
with stimulus C correct in 70% of CD trials, and the stimulus pair
EF was the least reliable, with stimulus E correct in 60% of the EF
trials. During this training phase, subjects learned to choose stim-
uli A, C, and E more frequently than B, D, or F. Of note, selection
of A over B could be achieved either by learning that choosing A
usually leads to positive feedback or learning that choosing B usu-
ally leads to negative feedback, or both. Participants completed
the training phase either under a “no stress,” “controllable stress,”
or “uncontrollable stress” condition. The training phase was ter-
minated after participants reached performance criteria (65% A
in AB, 60% C in CD, and 50% E in EF) or after the comple-
tion of six blocks. The performance criteria were set so that all
FIGURE 2 | (A) Schematic representation of the training phase of the
Probabilistic Stimulus Selection Task, which was performed under stress or
no stress conditions. In the no-stress condition, every time a red border
flashed, participants were instructed to press a foot pedal to indicate they
were attending to the task. In the two stress conditions, participants were
told that the border flashing red indicated a shock might occur in the
ensuing 15–30 s. In the controllable stress condition, participants were
further instructed that they could reduce (though not fully eliminate) the
likelihood of the shock if they pressed the foot pedal when they saw the red
border cue. In contrast, participants in the “uncontrollable stress” condition
were instructed to press the foot pedal to indicate they were attending to
the task. (B) Schematic representation of the test phase of the Probabilistic
Stimulus Selection Task. No stress was presented during this phase.
participants would be at approximately the same performance
level before proceeding to the test phase (i.e., there was no “over-
training” for subjects who had already learned the contingencies
because they would advance to the test phase earlier).
In the test phase, subjects were presented with the same three
stimuli pairs, as well as all novel combinations of stimuli pairs,
and feedback was not provided (Figure 2). In order to exam-
ine whether subjects learned more about the positive or negative
outcomes of their decisions in the training phase, the stimuli
pairs of primary interest in the test phase were those involv-
ing an A or B stimulus paired with a novel stimulus (e.g., AC,
AD, AE, and AF; BC, BD, BE, and BF), referred to as “trans-
fer pairs.” These transfer pairs enabled assessment of the degree
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to which participants learned from prior positive feedback to
choose the most reinforced stimulus (“Choose A”) and/or learned
from prior negative feedback to avoid the most punished stimu-
lus (“Avoid B”). Prior studies have shown that these conditions
are differentially sensitive to dopaminergic manipulation and
that performance in the “Choose A” condition is correlated with
neural responses to positive outcomes, whereas performance in
the “Avoid B” condition is correlated with neural responses to
negative outcomes.
The stimuli presented in the PSST were black-and-white
Hiragana characters. In the training phase, each trial began with a
fixation cross in the middle of the screen for 1000ms, followed
by a stimuli pair for 2000ms or until the participant made a
response. Thereafter, visual feedback was provided for 1500ms as
either “Correct” in blue letters, “Incorrect” in red letters, or “No
response detected” in red letters (if the subject did not respond
within 2000ms). Each block of the training phase had 60 trials
with 20 trials per stimuli pair. In the test phase, each trial began
with a fixation cross for 1000ms, followed by a stimuli pair for
3000ms or until the participant made a response. The test phase
consisted of one block of 90 trials, with six trials of each of the 15
possible stimuli pairs.
Saliva samples
For saliva collection, participants were instructed to put a small
cotton roll (Salivette) in their mouth for approximately 90 s, and
then place the saliva-soaked cotton into a small plastic tube. Saliva
samples were subsequently stored in a freezer (≤ −20 degrees
Celsius) until assayed. The timing of the collection of cortisol
samples (specified in the Procedures section above) was based
on prior research indicating that cortisol typically peaks about
10–20min after stressor onset (e.g., Kudielka et al., 2004). To con-
trol for diurnal rhythms in cortisol levels, all participants were
run between the hours of 1 and 6 pm (Dickerson and Kemeny,
2004). To further control for fluctuations in hormone levels,
participants were asked to adhere to the following instructions:
no eating or brushing their teeth for at least an hour before
the session; no consumption of yogurt for at least 2 h before
the session; no consumption of any caffeine-containing prod-
ucts or alcohol the day of the session; no strenuous exercise
the day of the session. Information was also collected regard-
ing the time of day participants woke up and the time of the
session.
DATA ANALYSES
Trait and dispositional self-report measures
Total and subscale scores were computed for the BDI,MASQ, PSS,
TEPS, and BIS/BAS, and t-tests were run to compare participants
who completed the task under “stress” vs. “no-stress” conditions.
“In-the-moment” state self-report measures
To assess the effectiveness of the stress manipulation, separate
mixed ANOVAs were conducted on STAI-S, PANAS-PA (posi-
tive affect), and PANAS-NA (negative affect) scores, with Time
(Baseline, PSST) as a repeated measure and Group (Stress, No-
Stress) as a between-subjects factor. Significant findings were
followed up with t-tests.
PSST training phase
To evaluate potential group differences in training, t-tests were
conducted to compare groups on the number of blocks required
to reach performance criteria; separate mixed ANOVAs were run
for accuracy and RT on the final training block with Trial Type
(AB, CD, EF) and Group as factors. Significant differences were
followed up with t-tests.
PSST test phase
Prior to the main analyses of interest, a t-test was run to compare
accuracy on AB trials (the “easiest” trial type) in the test phase to
confirm that there were no significant differences between “stress”
and “no stress” groups with regard to participants learning the
basic task. Although the performance criteria in the training
phase was intended to address this issue, it is possible that par-
ticipants could have become confused by the lack of feedback and
the addition of novel stimuli pairs in the test phase, so this served
to verify that learning carried over to the test phase.
Thereafter, to assess whether participants learned more from
the positive or negative feedback they received during training,
data from the test phase were analyzed with respect to perfor-
mance on the test trials involving novel combinations of stimuli
pairs that included either an A or a B stimulus, respectively.
For trials involving an A stimulus paired with a novel stimulus
(“Choose A” trials), accuracy was calculated as the proportion of
trials on which the participant chose A (the most frequently rein-
forced stimulus) over the novel stimulus. For trials involving a B
stimulus paired with a novel stimulus (“Avoid B” trials), accuracy
was calculated as the proportion of trials on which the participant
avoided B (the most frequently punished stimulus) and chose the
novel stimulus instead. Next, ANOVAs were performed with Trial
Type (“Choose A,” “Avoid B”) and Group as factors to examine
accuracy and RT separately. Significant differences were followed
up with the appropriate t-tests.
Saliva samples (cortisol)
In order to obtain cortisol levels, saliva samples were sent
to the Laboratory for Biological Health Psychology (Brandeis
University, MA, USA) and analyzed in a single batch to avoid assay
variability (intra-assay CV = 6.48%; inter-assay CV = 6.06%).
These values were then entered into an ANOVA using Time
(T1 = baseline, T2 = post-“filler”-task/pre-PSST, T3 = post-
PSST) and Group as factors. Given the diurnal drop in cortisol
levels throughout the day (Schmidt-Reinwald et al., 1999), and
the inevitable variability in wake-up time across participants, we
also calculated the difference between waking time and time of
the first saliva collection; this value was used as a covariate in the
aforementioned ANOVA. Next, in line with previous studies (e.g.,
Townsend et al., 2011), we calculated cortisol reactivity scores
(i.e., difference scores from T1 to T2, or T1 to T3) for all partici-
pants. Finally, an ANOVA was run to compare cortisol reactivity
scores with Group.
Follow-up analyses: using changes in cortisol levels and
self-reported state anxiety to identify a stress-reactive subgroup
Given that “threat of shock” might only have been stressful
for a sub-group of participants, we identified individuals who
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were relatively high stress responders based on changes in cor-
tisol levels and self-reported state anxiety from T1 (baseline)
to T2 (∼13min after subjects received the shock administered
in the “filler” task). Initially, we examined descriptive statis-
tics on the distribution of cortisol reactivity scores from T2-T1
within “no-stress” and “stress” groups to examine if there was
indeed considerable variability in reactivity scores within each
group. In order to obtain a new “stress reactive” group with
only stress-reactive participants, we first standardized the T2-
T1 cortisol reactivity scores across all participants. Next, using
these standardized values, participants were divided into three
tiers: high responders (>0.24), medium responders (−0.27 ≥
and ≤ 0.24), and low responders (< −0.27). These cut-off scores
were selected so that approximately 1/3 of participants were in
each tier. Similarly, we standardized the T2-T1 change scores in
self-reported state anxiety levels (using STAI scores), and again
divided participants into three tiers: high responders (>0.44),
medium responders (−0.66 ≥ and ≤ 0.44), and low responders
(< −0.66). Thereafter, a new “stress reactive” group was cre-
ated that included only participants who completed the task
under stress and were relatively high stress responders, defined
as being in the “high responder” tier with regard to both changes
in cortisol levels and self-reported state anxiety. Using this new
“stress reactive” group, all of the aforementioned analyses were
re-run to compare the “stress reactive” and “no-stress” groups on
demographics, trait and state self-report measures, and perfor-
mance on the PSST task.
RESULTS
TRAIT AND DISPOSITIONAL SELF-REPORT MEASURES (NO-STRESS vs.
STRESS GROUPS)
As evident in Table 1, there were no significant differences
between the “no-stress” and “stress” groups on the trait or dispo-
sitional self-report measures collected at baseline (all ts ≤ 1.67,
ps ≥ 0.10). Accordingly, putative differences in behavioral per-
formance or stress reactivity were not confounded by group
differences in trait or dispositional affect, or ongoing stress levels.
“IN-THE-MOMENT” STATE SELF-REPORT MEASURES (NO-STRESS vs.
STRESS GROUPS)
Analyses of both state anxiety (STAI-S scores) and negative affect
(PANAS-NA scores) revealed similar effects: significant Time ×
Group interactions [Fs(1, 93) > 5.06, ps < 0.03], along with sig-
nificant main effects of Time [Fs(1, 93) > 8.80, ps < 0.01] and
Group [Fs(1, 93) > 4.87, ps ≤ 0.03]. Importantly, at baseline,
groups did not differ in their levels of state anxiety or negative
affect [ts(93) < 0.46, ps > 0.64]. During the PSST, participants in
the “stress” group reported significantly higher levels of state anx-
iety and negative affect than participants in the “no-stress” group
[ts(93) > 3.00, p < 0.01]. Within-group paired t-tests indicated
Table 1 | Demographics, trait and dispositional self-report measures by groups.
No stress (NS)




group (n = 18)
NS vs. S
statistic
p NS vs. SR
statistic
P
Gender (% female) 100% 100% 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Age (years) 21.43 (±1.79) 21.32 (±2.20) 22.05 (±1.92) t(93) = 0.22 0.83 t(43) = 1.11 0.28
Education (years) 14.81 (±1.39) 14.35 (±1.61) 14.94 (±1.35) t(93) = 1.31 0.19 t(43) = 0.31 0.76
Marital status (% single) 100% 93% 89% χ2(2) = 2.10 0.35 χ2(1) = 3.14 0.08
Income* (% < $50,000) 90% 74% 69% χ2(1) = 2.29 0.13 χ2(1) = 2.29 0.13
Compensation form
(% monetary)
85% 90% 78% χ2(1) = 0.39 0.54 χ2(1) = 0.41 0.52
Ethnicity (% Caucasian) 85% 59% 61% χ2(2) = 10.07 0.01 χ2(1) = 3.39 0.07
BDI-II 1.85 (±2.38) 2.21 (±2.34) 1.67 (±2.03) t(93) = −0.66 0.51 t(43) = 0.27 0.79
MASQ: GDA 15.52 (±4.74) 15.66 (±3.90) 16.22 (±3.21) t(93) = −0.15 0.88 t(43) = −0.55 0.59
MASQ: GDD 16.85 (±5.25) 18.10 (±5.12) 17.72 (±5.79) t(93) = −1.07 0.29 t(43) = −0.52 0.60
MASQ: AA 20.52 (±4.82) 19.59 (±3.62) 19.28 (±3.05) t(93) = 1.03 0.31 t(43) = 0.97 0.34
MASQ: AD 49.56 (±10.90) 49.71 (±10.68) 45.83 (±8.99) t(93) = −0.06 0.95 t(43) = 1.20 0.24
Perceived stress scale 19.67 (±6.33) 20.68 (±5.86) 20.83 (±4.62) t(93) = −0.74 0.46 t(43) = −0.67 0.51
TEPS: anticipatory 64.67 (±6.68) 64.65 (±9.78) 66.11 (±7.80) t(93) = 0.01 0.99 t(43) = −0.67 0.51
TEPS: consummatory 48.41 (±5.56) 50.66 (±6.06) 52.22 (±5.70) t(93) = −1.67 0.10 t(43) = −2.23 0.03
BIS/BAS: reward
responsiveness
7.48 (±1.67) 7.51 (±2.18) 7.56 (±2.09) t(93) = −0.07 0.94 t(43) = −0.13 0.90
BIS/BAS: drive 9.19 (±1.96) 9.06 (±2.13) 9.06 (±1.73) t(93) = 0.27 0.79 t(43) = 0.23 0.82
BIS/BAS: fun seeking 8.04 (±2.16) 7.78 (±2.23) 8.00 (±2.47) t(93) = 0.51 0.61 t(43) = 0.05 0.96
BIS/BAS: inhibition 16.00 (±2.82) 15.40 (±2.83) 15.33 (±2.74) t(93) = 0.94 0.35 t(43) = 0.79 0.44
BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; MASQ, Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; GDA, General Distress Anxious; GDD, General Distress Depressive; AA,
Anxious Arousal; AD, Anhedonic Depression; TEPS, Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale; BIS/BAS, Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales.
*Participants who chose not to report income are not included in the Income statistics; 7 out of 27 (26%) “no stress” participants and 15 out of 68 (22%) “stress”
participants chose not to report income. The bold values serve to highlight statistically significant values.
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that anxiety increased from baseline to PSST in the “no stress”
group [t(26) = 2.17, p = 0.04] and, to a much greater degree, in
the “stress” group [t(67) = 8.54, p < 0.01]. Meanwhile, negative
affect increased significantly from baseline to PSST in the “stress”
group [t(67) = 4.45, p < 0.01] but not in the “no stress” group
[t(26) = 0.62, p = 0.54]. Themixed ANOVAon PANAS-PA scores
revealed only a significant main effect of Time [F(1, 93) = 11.33,
p < 0.01; all other Fs < 2.58, ps > 0.11], with levels of positive
affect decreasing from baseline to PSST in both groups.
PSST TRAINING PHASE (NO-STRESS vs. STRESS GROUPS)
Groups did not differ in the number of completed training
blocks [t(93) = 0.27, p = 0.79]; all groups took approximately
three blocks to advance to the test phase (No-Stress: 3.15 ± 1.75;
Stress: 3.25 ± 1.62). A Trial Type (AB, CD, EF) × Group (“no
stress,” “stress”) mixed ANOVA on accuracy scores in the final
training block indicated only a significant main effect of Trial
Type [F(1, 93) = 24.71, p < 0.01; all other Fs < 2.41, ps > 0.12];
as expected, participants were most accurate on the AB trial type
and least accurate on the EF trial type. No significant differences
emerged from the mixed ANOVA for RT in the final training
block (all Fs < 1.06, ps > 0.30). Altogether, these findings indi-
cate that (1) the probabilistic contingencies elicited the intended
behavioral effects, and (2) groups did not differ in performance
during the training phase.
PSST TEST PHASE (NO-STRESS vs. STRESS GROUPS)
The groups did not differ significantly in their accuracy on
AB trials in the test phase [No-Stress Group = 90% (±12%);
Stress Group = 86% (±23%); [t(93) = 0.94, p = 0.35]], confirm-
ing that learning carried over to the test phase similarly for the
two groups. Contrary to hypotheses, the Trial Type (“Choose
A,” “Avoid B”) × Group ANOVA on accuracy scores revealed no
significant effects (all Fs< 1.82, ps> 0.17).
For RT scores, the analogous Trial Type × Group ANOVA
yielded a significant main effect of Trial Type [F(1, 93) = 29.52,
p < 0.01] and a trend for a Trial Type × Group interaction
[F(1, 93) = 3.29, p = 0.07]. These results reflected both groups
being faster on “Choose A” trials than “Avoid B” trials, with the
“no-stress” group demonstrating this pattern to a greater extent.
STRESS-REACTIVE SUBGROUP (DEFINED BY CHANGES IN CORTISOL
LEVELS AND SELF-REPORTED STATE ANXIETY)
An examination of descriptive statistics on the distribution of
cortisol reactivity scores at T2-T1 within “no-stress” and “stress”
groups revealed considerable variability in reactivity scores within
each group: scores in the “no stress” group ranged from −5.51 to
1.71 (mean: −1.56 ± 1.57); scores in the “stress” group ranged
from −7.82 to 11.78 (mean: −0.95 ± 2.40). Per design, cortisol
reactivity scores at T2-T1 were significantly higher in the new
“stress reactive” group than the “no-stress” group [t(42) = 4.01,
p < 0.01; degrees of freedom reduced by 1 because cortisol data
was missing for one subject at T2]. Importantly, cortisol reac-
tivity scores at T3-T1 continued to be significantly higher in
the “stress reactive” group than the “no-stress” group [t(41) =
3.75, p < 0.01; degrees of freedom reduced by 2 because cortisol
data missing for two subjects at T3], suggesting that subjects in
the “stress reactive” group continued to be more physiologically
stressed during the PSST than subjects in the “no stress” group.
The new groups did not differ significantly from each other on
any of the following demographic variables: gender, age, years of
education, marital status, income level, form of compensation, or
ethnicity (see Table 1).
TRAIT AND DISPOSITIONAL SELF-REPORT MEASURES (NO-STRESS vs.
STRESS-REACTIVE GROUPS)
As compared to the “no-stress” group, the “stress reactive” group
reported significantly higher scores on the consummatory sub-
scale of the Temporal Experiences of Pleasure Scale (TEPS), which
assesses individual trait dispositions in consummatory experi-
ences of pleasure [t(43) = 2.23, p = 0.03; all other ts(43) ≤ 1.36,
ps≥ 0.18]. Due to this finding, the TEPS consummatory subscore
was used as a covariate.
“IN-THE-MOMENT” STATE SELF-REPORT MEASURES (NO-STRESS vs.
STRESS-REACTIVE GROUPS)
State anxiety
As shown in Figure 3, and in line with the new group design,
the ANCOVA on STAI-S scores revealed only a significant Time ×
Group interaction [F(1, 42) = 13.33, p < 0.01], whereas the Time
[F(1, 42) = 0.29, p = 0.59] and Group [F(1, 42) = 3.52, p = 0.07]
effects were not significant. At baseline, groups did not differ in
their state anxiety levels [t(43) = −0.48, p = 0.63]. During the
PSST, participants in the “stress reactive” group reported sig-
nificantly higher levels of state anxiety than participants in the
“no-stress” group [t(43) = 3.57, p < 0.01]. Within-group paired
t-tests indicated that anxiety increased from baseline to PSST in
both the “stress reactive” group [t(17) = 6.31, p < 0.01] and “no
stress” group [t(26) = 2.17, p = 0.04].
State negative affect
The ANCOVA on PANAS-NA scores indicated only a signifi-
cant Time × Group interaction [F(1, 42) = 6.00, p = 0.02]; Time
[F(1, 42) = 0.95, p = 0.33] and Group [F(1, 42) = 3.57, p = 0.07];
see Figure 3. At baseline, groups did not differ in their levels of
negative affect [t(43) = −0.12, p = 0.90]; during the PSST, the
“stress reactive” group reported significantly more negative affect
than the “no stress” group [t(43) = 2.90, p < 0.01]. Paired t-tests
indicated that negative affect increased significantly from baseline
to PSST in the “stress reactive” group [t(17) = 3.03, p < 0.01], but
not in the “no stress” group [t(26) = 0.62, p = 0.54].
State positive affect
The ANCOVA revealed no significant effects (all Fs < 1.95,
ps > 0.17).
PSST TRAINING PHASE (NO-STRESS vs. STRESS-REACTIVE GROUPS)
Groups did not differ in the number of completed training blocks
[t(43) = 0.57, p = 0.58]; all groups took approximately three
blocks to advance to the test phase (No-Stress: 3.15 ± 1.75; Stress-
Reactive: 3.44 ± 1.69). Separate Trial Type (AB, CD, EF) × Group
(“no stress,” “stress reactive”) ANCOVAs on accuracy scores
and RT scores revealed no significant effects (all Fs < 3.13, all
ps > 0.08).
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FIGURE 3 | Affective ratings in the no-stress (n = 27) and
stress-reactive (n = 18) groups at baseline and during the PSST. (A)
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) scores; and (B) Negative Affect score
on the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). For both scales, the
state version was used.
PSST TEST PHASE (NO-STRESS vs. STRESS-REACTIVE GROUPS)
The ANCOVA comparing accuracy on AB trials in the test
phase with Group (“no stress,” “stress reactive”) revealed no sig-
nificant group differences [No-Stress Group = 90% (±12%);
Stress-Reactive Group = 92% (±16%); [F(1, 42) = 0.63, p =
0.43], confirming that learning carried over to the test phase sim-
ilarly for the two groups. Critically, the Trial Type (“Choose A,”
“Avoid B”) × Group (“no stress,” “stress reactive”) ANCOVA on
accuracy scores revealed a main effect of Trial Type [F(1, 42) =
5.72, p = 0.02], which was qualified by a significant Group ×
Trial Type interaction [F(1, 42) = 6.45, p = 0.015], whereas the
Group main effect was not significant [F(1, 42) = 0.14, p = 0.71].
As shown in Figure 4, these findings indicate that the “stress reac-
tive” group displayed relatively lower accuracy on reward-related
trials than punishment-related trials compared to the “no stress”
group, which exhibited the opposite pattern.
FIGURE 4 | Performance on “Choose A” and “Avoid B” trials during the
PSST test phase in the no-stress (n = 27) and stress-reactive (n = 18)
groups. (A) Accuracy; (B) Reaction Time (in ms).
For RT, an analogous Group × Trial Type ANCOVA yielded
only a significant main effect of Group [F(1, 42) = 7.59, p < 0.01;
all other ps > 0.18], due to faster RTs in the “no-stress” group
than the “stress reactive” group (Figure 4). Follow-up analyses
indicated that, compared to the “no stress” group, participants
in the “stress reactive” group demonstrated significantly slower
RTs on the “Choose A” trials [F(1, 42) = 13.67, p < 0.01], but not
the “Avoid B” trials [F(1, 42) = 3.13, p = 0.08]. Moreover, partic-
ipants within the “no stress” group were faster on their “Choose
A” trials than their “Avoid B” trials [t(26) = −4.47, p < 0.01], sug-
gestive of a reward-related RT bias, whereas those in the “stress
reactive” group had similar RTs on both trial types [t(17) = −1.41,
p = 0.18] and did not show this effect.
DISCUSSION
This study was designed to extend our understanding of stress-
related anhedonic behavior by examining whether stress specif-
ically reduces reward processing (i.e., learning from positive
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feedback) or more generally influences incentive processing
(i.e., learning from both positive and negative feedback). The
stress manipulation induced significantly higher levels of nega-
tive affect and anxiety in those individuals who completed the
PSST under stress vs. no-stress conditions. Yet, contrary to our
hypotheses, the stress manipulation did not have a significant
differential impact on cortisol reactivity or task performance
at the group level, likely due to large individual differences.
Importantly, however, individuals with heightened cortisol reac-
tivity and increased negative affect following acute stress did
demonstrate deficits specific to reward processing. These lat-
ter findings suggest that, in highly stress-reactive individuals,
stress may selectively result in reward processing deficits with no
reduction in punishment processing.
Given that the “threat-of-shock” stressor did evoke signifi-
cantly higher levels of self-reported negative affect and anxiety
in the “stress” group than the “no-stress” group, which was in
line with prior independent studies (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006;
Bogdan et al., 2011), we were surprised to find that the “stress”
group did not demonstrate significantly higher levels of cortisol
reactivity. In light of these patterns, it is possible that our stress
manipulation may not have elicited as strong of a physiologi-
cal stress response as intended because only a single shock was
administered during the “filler” task and none were administered
during the PSST. In addition, the stress manipulation did not
include any social evaluative component, which has been shown
to reliably produce physiological stress responses (Kirschbaum
et al., 1993). Moreover, for participants in the “stress” group,
the border of the computer screen flashing red during the PSST
indicated that a shock could occur in the next 15–30 seconds;
it is possible that this cue may have reduced the stressfulness of
the “threat-of-shock” by increasing the perceived predictability of
the stressor. In fact, predictable stressors typically elicit smaller
physiological stress responses and are experienced as less aversive
than unpredictable stressors (Anisman and Matheson, 2005). In
light of these null cortisol findings, it was not entirely surprising
that initial analyses of task performance across groups yielded no
significant between-group differences during the training or test
phases of the PSST.
One potential explanation for the lack of significant findings
in this initial set of analyses may be that there was a broad range
of individual differences within the group of individuals who
completed the task under stress in terms of how physiologically
“stressed out” participants became in response to the “threat-
of-shock.” An examination of cortisol reactivity scores within
each group indeed confirmed that there was substantial intra-
group variability. Accordingly, we conducted follow-up analyses
by identifying a stress-reactive subgroup based on cortisol reactiv-
ity as well as self-reported anxiety levels; the new “stress reactive”
group included only those participants who completed the task
under stress and were “high responders” from both a physiolog-
ical (cortisol levels) and self-reported experiential (STAI scores)
perspective. In line with these demarcations, the new “stress reac-
tive” group also demonstrated a significant increase in negative
affect (PANAS-NA scores) that was not apparent in the “no stress”
group, reinforcing coalescence between biological measures and
self-report measures of stress response.
STRESS-SENSITIVE INDIVIDUALS DEMONSTRATE REWARD-SPECIFIC
IMPAIRMENTS
Consistent with previous studies (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006;
Pizzagalli et al., 2007; Bogdan et al., 2010), and ourmain hypothe-
ses, participants in the new “stress reactive” group demonstrated
reduced reward sensitivity relative to participants in the “no-
stress” group. This was supported in the following ways: first,
there was a significantGroup (“no stress,” “stress reactive”)×Trial
Type (“Choose A,” “Avoid B”) interaction for accuracy during the
test phase of the PSST, which was due to relatively lower accuracy
on reward-related (“Choose A”) trials than punishment-related
(“Avoid B”) trials in the “stress reactive” group, compared with
the opposite pattern exhibited by the “no-stress” group (i.e., rela-
tively higher accuracy on reward-related than punishment-related
trials). This finding suggests that stress-sensitive participants did
not experience a global decrease in accuracy on the task under
stress, but rather amore specific reduction in accuracy on reward-
related trials only. This reward-processing deficit may reflect
reduced sensitivity to positive feedback (during the training phase
of the PSST), evident in an impaired ability to use this reward
information to guide decision making in novel contexts (dur-
ing the test phase of the PSST). Secondly, participants in the
“no-stress” group demonstrated a reward-related RT bias that
was absent in the “stress reactive” group. Specifically, the “no
stress” group demonstrated faster RTs on reward-related trials
than punishment-related trials, while the RTs of the “stress reac-
tive” group were not significantly different between trial types.
Moreover, participants in the “no-stress” group were signifi-
cantly faster than participants in the “stress reactive” group on
the reward-related trials but not the punishment-related trials.
Importantly, these findings suggest that speed-accuracy trade-
offs did not play a significant role in the present results. For
example, the fact that the “stress reactive” group, as compared
to the “no stress” group, had poorer accuracy and slower RTs on
reward-related trials runs counter to the notion that poorer accu-
racy could have been due to a speed-accuracy tradeoff of faster
RTs. Overall, our results expand prior lines of research on stress-
induced reductions in reward responsiveness by suggesting that
stress may selectively reduce sensitivity to reward feedback and
does not more broadly reduce sensitivity to feedback in general.
During the test phase, there were no group differences in
accuracy on the most salient trials from the training phase
(e.g., AB trials), which (1) suggests that all participants learned
the basic task and this learning carried over to the test phase,
and (2) provides further evidence that stress did not induce a
global performance deficit across the task (e.g., differences only
emerged for novel trial types in the test phase). These find-
ings, in combination with the fact that participants across groups
needed a comparable number of training blocks to reach per-
formance criteria during the training phase, also suggest that
results were not likely the byproduct of psychometric artifacts.
More specifically, as highlighted in experiments assessing the
effects of threat on working memory performance (Shackman
et al., 2006), it is important to address whether results could be
merely the artifact of an additional load on attentional resources
in the stress condition, rather than stress per se. If this were
the case, however, we would expect to see global deficits in task
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performance for individuals who completed the task under stress.
In addition, a predominant lack of group differences on trait and
dispositional self-report measures (the one exception being the
consummatory subscale of the TEPS, which was controlled for
in the analyses), and no group differences at baseline on any
affective state self-report measures, suggests that putative dif-
ferences in behavioral performance or stress reactivity were not
confounded by group differences in affect, mood, or ongoing
life stress.
In related research that warrants acknowledgement, Lighthall
and colleagues (2013) recently reported that participants who
completed a PSST after exposure to a cold pressor stress manipu-
lation had relatively reduced punishment learning and increased
reward learning. However, the stressor was terminated well before
the beginning of the PSST (and an unrelated memory task was
administered between the stressor and the PSST); this sequence
of events raises the possibility that their observed results may
have stemmed from “relief” experienced by participants after
the stressor. In line with the conceptualization of “stress relief”
as rewarding, “relief” from stressors has been recently associ-
ated with activation of reward-related neural regions (Leknes
et al., 2011) and increased dopamine levels (Navratilova et al.,
2012). Clearly, more research is needed to examine the putative
relationship between negative stressors and decreased reward sen-
sitivity, with particular focus on the temporal unfolding of such
processes.
LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations to the current study that should be
acknowledged. First, the study included only female participants
due to sex differences in psychological and hormonal responses
to stress (e.g., women demonstrate a more pronounced stress
response than men; Nolen-Hoeksema and Hilt, 2009). Thus,
future studies will be required to determine if the current stress-
induced reward-specific deficits generalize to males. Second, the
strength of findings is limited by the fact that significant between-
group results only emerged after re-running the main analyses of
interest using a “stress reactive” subgroup defined based on phys-
iological and self-reported experiential indices of stress respon-
siveness. This new “stress reactive” group had a relatively small
sample size and contained participants who had received two dif-
ferent sets of instructions regarding controllability of the stressor.
However, the lack of significant differences between these partici-
pants (with regard to both self-report and physiological measures;
see Appendix Analyses) mitigates the potential effect of this
latter limitation. Third, it is important to acknowledge the inher-
ently limited ecological validity of an acute “threat-of-shock”
laboratory stressor and the potentially diminished strength of
laboratory stressors that do not include a social evaluative com-
ponent. Fourth, given that findings from this study pertain to
learning from positive vs. negative feedback, it remains to be
seen whether the patterns found will generalize to other types of
rewards and punishments. Finally, in order to further evaluate
whether stress-induced reward deficits are a potential mecha-
nism underlying the link between stress and depression, it will
be imperative to run parallel experiments in MDD individuals.
In spite of these limitations, the current study has substantial
translational value and significant strengths, including the use
of a well-controlled experimental procedure (threat-of-shock) to
superimpose an acute stress manipulation on a primary task (the
PSST).
CONCLUSIONS
In sum, results from the current biologically informed analy-
ses support a priori hypotheses and previous research findings
(Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006; Pizzagalli et al., 2007; Bogdan et al.,
2010) by demonstrating that stress-reactive individuals under
stress exhibit reduced reward processing (i.e., reduced sensitiv-
ity to positive feedback, evident in an impaired ability to use this
reward information to guide decision making in novel contexts)
relative to individuals not under stress. These results are also in
line with recent neuroimaging studies that have shown reduced
activation in reward-related neural areas in response to stress
inductions implemented immediately prior to reward processing
tasks (Ossewaarde et al., 2011; Porcelli et al., 2012). Critically,
findings from the current study extend this area of research by
providing initial evidence that these stress-induced deficits appear
to be reward-specific and not generalizable to punishment pro-
cessing. Given that negative life stress often precedes depression
onset (Kendler et al., 1999) and predicts clinical severity (Tennant,
2002), the current results also provide support for the possibility
that stress-induced hedonic deficits may be a potential mech-
anism underlying the connection between negative stress and
depressive episodes. In this way, such results are in line with
conceptualizations of stress-induced anhedonia as a potential vul-
nerability factor for depression (Berghorst and Pizzagalli, 2010,
for review). Although promising, it is important to emphasize
that (1) these findings emerged in the context of an only par-
tially successful stress manipulation (see Appendix); (2) findings
emerged only after a subgroup of stress-reactive participants was
identified; and (3) the ecological validity of the stress manipu-
lation was limited. Accordingly, these findings await replications
and conclusions should be tempered. Future studies also need
to examine whether the stress-induced rapid activation of the
mesocortical DA system and inhibition of the mesolimbic DA sys-
tem in animal models (Cabib and Puglisi-Allegra, 1996; Cabib
et al., 2002) represent biological mechanisms fundamental to the
current study findings.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This project was supported in part by a Sackler Fellowship in
Psychobiology awarded to Lisa Berghorst and NIMH grants (R01
MH068376, R01MH095809) awarded to Diego A. Pizzagalli. The
authors would like to thankDrs.Wendy Berry Mendes and Jeremy
Jamieson for their guidance in the methods of cortisol data col-
lection and analysis; and Dr. Jill Hooley for her valuable feedback
and support throughout the project.
DISCLOSURES
Dr. Pizzagalli has received consulting fees from ANT North
America Inc. (Advanced Neuro Technology), AstraZeneca, Shire,
Servier, and Ono Pharma USA, as well as honoraria from
AstraZeneca for projects unrelated to the current research. All
other authors report no competing interests.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 133 | 10
Berghorst et al. Stress selectively reduces reward sensitivity
REFERENCES
American Psychiatric Association.
(2000). Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental disorders. (4th
Edn., text revision). Washington,
DC: American Psychiatric Press.
Anisman, H., and Matheson, K. (2005).
Stress, depression, and anhedonia:
caveats concerning animal mod-
els. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 29,
525–546.
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., and Brown,
G. K. (1996). Beck Depression
Inventory Manual. 2nd Edn. San
Antonio, TX: The Psychological
Corporation.
Berenbaum, H., and Connelly, J.
(1993). The effect of stress on hedo-
nic capacity. J. Abnorm. Psychol.
102, 474–481.
Berghorst, L., and Pizzagalli, D.
A. (2010). “Defining depres-
sion endophenotypes,” in Next
Generation Antidepressants. Moving
Beyond Monoamines To Discover
Novel And Differentiated Treatment
Strategies For Mood Disorders, eds
C. E. Beyer and S. A. Stahl (New
York, NY: Cambridge University
Press), 70–89.
Bogdan, R., Perlis, R. H., Fagerness,
J., and Pizzagalli, D. A. (2010).
The impact of mineralocorti-
coid receptor ISO/VAL genotype
(rs5522) and stress on reward
learning. Genes Brain Behav. 9,
658–667.
Bogdan, R., and Pizzagalli, D. A.
(2006). Acute stress reduces reward
responsiveness: implications for
depression. Biol. Psychiatry 60,
1147–1154.
Bogdan, R., Santesso, D. L., Fagerness,
J., Perlis, R. H., and Pizzagalli,
D. A. (2011). Corticotropin-
releasing hormone receptor type
1 (CRHR1) genetic variation
and stress interact to influence
reward learning. J. Neurosci. 31,
13246–13254.
Cabib, S., and Puglisi-Allegra, S.




Cabib, S., Ventura, R., and Puglisi-
Allegra, S. (2002). Opposite
imbalances between mesocortical
and mesoaccumbens dopamine
responses to stress by the same
genotype depending on living
conditions. Behav. Brain Res. 129,
179–185.
Campbell-Sills, L., Liverant, G.
I., and Brown, T. A. (2004).
Psychometric evaluation of the
behavioral inhibition/behavioral
activation scales in a large sample
of outpatients with anxiety and
mood disorders. Psychol. Assess. 16,
244–254.
Carver, C. S., and White, T. L. (1994).
Behavioral inhibition, behav-
ioral activation, and affective
responses to impending reward
and punishment: the BIS/BAS
scales. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 67,
319–333.
Cavanagh, J. F., Frank, M. J., and Allen,
J. J. (2010). Social stress reactiv-
ity alters reward and punishment
learning. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci.
6, 1–10.
Chapman, L. J., and Chapman, J.
P. (1987). The measurement
of handedness. Brain Cogn. 6,
175–183.
Cohen, S., Kamarck, T., and
Mermelstein, R. (1983). A global
measure of perceived stress.
J. Health Soc. Behav. 24, 385–396.




Dickerson, S. S., and Kemeny, M. E.
(2004). Acute stressors and corti-
sol responses: a theoretical inte-
gration and synthesis of labora-
tory research. Psychol. Bull. 130,
355–391.
Edwards, M. S., Burt, J. S., and Lipp,
O. V. (2006). Selective process-
ing of masked and unmasked
verbal threat material in anxi-
ety: influence of an immediate
acute stressor. Cogn. Emot. 20,
812–835.
Edwards, M. S., Burt, J. S., and Lipp,
O. V. (2010). Selective attention
for masked and unmasked emo-
tionally toned stimuli: effects of
trait anxiety, state anxiety, and
test order. Br. J. Psychol. 101,
325–343.
First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., and
Gibbon, M. (1995). Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV. New
York, NY: Biometrics Research
Department.
Frank, M. J., Seeberger, L. C., and
O’Reilly, R. C. (2004). By carrot
or by stick: cognitive reinforcement
learning in Parkinsonism. Science
306, 1940–1943.
Gard, D. E., Gard, M. G., Kring, A. M.,
and John, O. P. (2006). Anticipatory
and consummatory components of
the experience of pleasure: a scale
development study. J. Res. Pers. 40,
1086–1102.
Henn, F. A., and Vollmayr, B. (2005).
Stress models of depression:
forming genetically vulnerable
strains. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 29,
799–804.
Kendler, K. S., Karkowski, L. M.,
and Prescott, C. A. (1999). Causal
relationship between stressful life
events and the onset of major
depression. Am. J. Psychiatry 156,
837–841.
Kirschbaum, K. M., Pirke, K. M.,
and Hellhammer, D. H. (1993).
The Trier Social Stress Test—a
tool for investigating psychobiolog-
ical stress responses in a labora-
tory setting. Neuropsychobiology 28,
76–81.
Kudielka, B. M., Buske-Kirschbaum,
A., Hellhammer, D. H., and
Kirschbaum, C. (2004). HPA
axis responses to laboratory psy-
chosocial stress in healthy elderly
adults, younger adults, and chil-
dren: impact of age and gender.
Psychoneuroendocrinology 29,
83–98.
Leknes, S., Lee, M., Berna, C.,
Andersson, J., and Tracey, I.
(2011). Relief as a reward: hedonic
and neural responses to safety from
pain. PLoS ONE 6:e17870. doi: 10.
1371/journal.pone.0017870
Lighthall, N. R., Gorlick, M. A.,
Schoeke, A., Frank, M. J., and
Mather, M. (2013). Stress modulates
reinforcement learning in younger
and older adults. Psychol. Aging 28,
35–46.
Liu, W. H., Chan, R. A., Wang,
L. Z., Huang, J., Cheung, E.
F., Gong, Q. Y., et al. (2011).
Deficits in sustaining reward




Mendes, W. B., Blascovich, J., Major, B.,
and Seery, M. D. (2001). Challenge
and threat responses during down-
ward and upward social compar-
isons. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 31,
477–497.
Navratilova, E., Xie, J. Y., Okun, A., Qu,
C., Eyde, N., Ci, S., et al. (2012).
Pain relief produces negative rein-
forcement through the activation
of mesolimbic reward-valuation cir-
cuitry. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
109, 20709–20713.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., and Hilt, L.,
(2009). “Gender differences in
depression,” in Handbook of
Depression, 2nd Edn., eds I. H.
Gotlib and C. L. Hammen (New
York, NY: Guilford), 386–404.
Ossewaarde, L., Qin, S., Van Marle, H.
J., van Wingen, G. A., Fernández,
G., and Hermans, E. J. (2011).
Stress-induced reduction in
reward-related prefrontal cor-
tex function. Neuroimage 55,
345–352.
Pizzagalli, D. A., Bogdan, R., Ratner,
K. G., and Jahn, A. L. (2007).
Increased perceived stress is associ-
ated with blunted hedonic capacity:
potential implications for depres-
sion research. Behav. Res. Ther. 45,
2742–2753.
Porcelli, A. J., Lewis, A. H., and
Delgado, M. R. (2012). Acute stress
influences neural circuits of reward
processing. Front. Neurosci. 6:157.
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00157
Robinson, O. J., Charney, D. R.,
Overstreet, C., Vytal, K., and
Grillon, C. (2012). The adaptive
threat bias in anxiety: amyg-
dala dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex coupling and aversive
amplification. Neuroimage 60,
523–529.
Robinson, O. J., Letkiewicz, A. M.,
Overstreet, C., Ernst, M., and
Grillon, C. (2011). The effect of
induced anxiety on cognition:
threat of shock enhances aversive
processing in healthy individuals.
Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 11,
217–227.
Shackman, A. J., Sarinopoulos, I.,
Maxwell, J. S., Pizzagalli, D., Lavric,
A., and Davidson, R. J. (2006).
Anxiety selectively disrupts visu-
ospatial working memory. Emotion
6, 40–61.
Schmidt-Reinwald, A., Pruessner, J. C.,
Hellhammer, D. H., Federenko, I.,
Rohleder, N., Schümeyer, T. H.,
et al. (1999). The cortisol response
to awakening in relation to dif-
ferent challenge tests and a 12-
hour cortisol rhythm. Life Sci. 64,
1653–1660.
Segal, D. L., Coolidge, F. L., Cahill,
B. S., and O’Riley, A. A. (2008).
Psychometric properties of the Beck
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-
II) among community-dwelling
older adults. Behav. Modif. 32,
3–20.
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L.,
Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., and
Jacobs, G. A. (1983). Manual for the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo
Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists
Press.
Steer, R. A., Rissmiller, D. J., and
Beck, A. T. (2000). Use of the
Beck Depression Inventory-II with
depressed geriatric inpatients.
Behav. Res. Ther. 38, 311–318.
Tennant, C. (2002). Life events, stress
and depression: a review of recent
findings. Aust. N.Z. J. Psychiatry 36,
173–182.
Townsend, S. S., Major, B., Gangi, C.
E., and Mendes, W. B. (2011). From
“In the Air” to “Under the Skin”:
cortisol responses to social identity
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 133 | 11
Berghorst et al. Stress selectively reduces reward sensitivity
threat. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 37,
151–164.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., and Tellegen,
A. (1988). Development and vali-
dation of brief measures of posi-
tive and negative affect: the PANAS
scales. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 54,
1063–1070.
Watson, D., Weber, K., Assenheimer, J.
S., Clark, L. A., Strauss, M. E., and
McCormick, R. A. (1995). Testing
a tripartite model: I. evaluating
the convergent and discriminant
validity of anxiety and depression
symptom scales. J. Abnorm. Psychol.
104, 3–14.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 17 January 2013; accepted: 25
March 2013; published online: 11 April
2013.
Citation: Berghorst LH, Bogdan R, Frank
MJ and Pizzagalli DA (2013) Acute
stress selectively reduces reward sensitiv-
ity. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:133. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00133
Copyright © 2013 Berghorst, Bogdan,
Frank and Pizzagalli. This is an
open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduc-
tion in other forums, provided the
original authors and source are cred-
ited and subject to any copyright
notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 133 | 12
Berghorst et al. Stress selectively reduces reward sensitivity
APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES
Trait and dispositional self-report measures
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) is a
21-item questionnaire used to measure depressive symptoms over
the past 2 weeks. It has strong internal reliability (0.86–0.92), high
test-retest reliability over 1-week (0.93), and good convergent and
discriminant validity (Beck et al., 1996; Steer et al., 2000; Segal
et al., 2008).
The Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ-
short) is a 62-item questionnaire used to assess symptoms of
anxiety and depression over the past week with good conver-
gent and discriminant validity in clinical and community samples
(Watson et al., 1995); it yields four subscales—general distress
anxious, anxious arousal, general distress depressive, and anhe-
donic depressive.
The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen et al., 1983) is a 14-
item measure used to assess the degree to which an individual
appraises the situations in his or her life as stressful over the past
month. Internal reliability coefficients for the PSS range from 0.84
to 0.86 with a test-retest reliability of 0.85 (over 2 days); the mea-
sure has been demonstrated to have strong convergent validity
(Cohen et al., 1983).
The Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS; Gard et al.,
2006) is a 14-item measure used to assess individual trait disposi-
tions in anticipatory and consummatory experiences of pleasure.
The scale has good internal consistency (0.71–0.79), high test-
retest reliability over 5–7 weeks (0.75–0.81), and strong conver-
gent and discriminant validity (Gard et al., 2006).
The Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales
(BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 1994) are used to measure indi-
vidual differences in sensitivity to two motivational systems pur-
ported to underlie behavior: a behavioral activation system and a
behavioral inhibition system. It has good convergent and discrim-
inant validity in community and clinical samples (Carver and
White, 1994; Campbell-Sills et al., 2004).
“In-the-moment” state self-report measures
The state form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S)
includes 20 items used to quantify state anxiety levels. Internal
consistency coefficients range from 0.86 to 0.95, while test-retest
reliability coefficients (over 2 months) range from 0.65 to 0.75
(Spielberger et al., 1983).
The state version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS) is used to measure current levels of positive and nega-
tive affect. Internal consistency coefficients range from 0.86–0.90
for the positive affect scale and 0.84–0.87 for the negative affect
scale; test-retest reliability coefficients (over 2 months) range
from 0.47–0.68 for the positive affect scale and 0.39–0.71 for the
negative affect scale (Watson et al., 1988).
The Challenge-Threat Questionnaire (Mendes et al., 2001)
was designed to assess individuals’ threat appraisals (perceived
resources/demands) of a task, with pre-task and post-task ver-
sions. Unfortunately, only 23 “controllable stress” participants
and 21 “uncontrollable stress” participants completed this mea-
sure since it was added midway through data collection. The pre-
task version typically includes 11 statements (e.g., “The upcoming
task will take a lot of effort to complete,” “I have the abilities to
perform the upcoming task successfully”) that participants rate
on a scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”)
to indicate how they are feeling about the task they are about
to complete. The pre-task version used in this study included
two additional items to assess participants’ perceived control over
general task performance, and perceived control over whether
shocks would occur in the upcoming task. Participants completed
the pre-task form after receiving PSST instructions but prior to
beginning the PSST. The post-task version typically includes nine
statements (e.g., “The task was very demanding,” “I felt that I
had the abilities to perform well in the task”), which participants
again rate on a scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly
agree”) to indicate how they feel about the task they just com-
pleted. The post-task version used in this study also included two
additional items to assess participants’ perceived control over gen-
eral task performance, and perceived control over whether shocks
occurred in the task. Participants completed the post-task form
after finishing the PSST.
ANALYSES
All analyses parallel those reported in the main manuscript (Trait
and dispositional self-report measures; “In-the-moment” state self-
report measures; PSST training phase; PSST test phase) except
they were computed using Group with three levels (“no stress,”
“controllable stress,” “uncontrollable stress”) in mixed ANOVAs.
RESULTS
Trait and dispositional self-report measures
There were no significant differences between groups on trait
and dispositional self-report measures collected at baseline
(all Fs < 2.09, ps> 0.13); see Table A1.
“In-the-moment” state self-report measures
State anxiety. The mixed ANOVA on STAI-S scores revealed
a significant main effect of Time [F(1, 92) = 65.68, p < 0.01]
and, more critically, a Time × Group interaction [F(2, 92) = 4.72,
p = 0.01]; Group was not significant [F(2, 92) = 2.71, p = 0.07].
Paired t-tests indicated that anxiety increased from baseline to
PSST in the “controllable stress” group [t(33) = 5.72, p < 0.01],
the “uncontrollable stress” group [t(33) = 6.29, p < 0.01], and
the “no stress” group [t(26) = 2.17, p = 0.04]. At baseline, there
were no group differences [F(2, 94) = 0.22, p = 0.81]. In line with
hypotheses, anxiety levels during the PSST were significantly
different between groups [F(2, 94) = 5.04, p < 0.01]. Follow-up
t-tests revealed that participants in both the “controllable stress”
[t(59) = 2.67, p = 0.01] and uncontrollable stress groups [t(59) =
3.00, p < 0.01] reported significantly higher anxiety than partic-
ipants in the “no-stress” group. However, contrary to hypotheses,
participants in the “controllable stress” group did not differ
from those in the “uncontrollable stress” group [t(66) = −0.24,
p = 0.81].
State negative affect. The mixed ANOVA on PANAS-NA scores
also revealed a significant main effect of Time [F(1, 92) = 16.87,
p < 0.01] and a Time × Group interaction [F(2, 92) = 3.29, p =
0.04]; Group was not significant [F(2, 92) = 2.55, p = 0.08].
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group (n = 34)
Uncontrollable stress
group (n = 34)
Statistics p
Gender (% female) 100% 100% 100% N/A N/A
Age (years) 21.43 (±1.79) 21.33 (±2.24) 21.32 (±2.20) F(2, 94) = 0.02 0.98
Education (years) 14.81 (±1.39) 14.44 (±1.69) 14.26 (±1.54) F(2, 94) = 0.96 0.39
Marital status (%single) 100% 91% 94% χ2(1) = 5.37 0.25
Income (% <$50,000) 90% 73% 74% χ2(1) = 2.29 0.32
Compensation form
(% monetary)
85% 91% 88% χ2(1) = 0.53 0.77
Ethnicity (% Hispanic) 7% 9% 6% χ2(1) = 0.22 0.90
Ethnicity (% Caucasian) 85% 44% 74% χ2(1) = 12.60 <0.01
BDI-II Score 1.85 (±2.38) 2.41 (±2.52) 2.00 (±2.16) F(2, 94) = 0.48 0.62
MASQ: GDA 15.52 (±4.74) 15.50 (±3.78) 15.82 (±4.06) F(2, 94) = 0.06 0.94
MASQ: GDD 16.85 (±5.25) 18.79 (±5.59) 17.41 (±4.59) F(2, 94) = 1.18 0.31
MASQ: AA 20.52 (±4.82) 19.94 (±4.32) 19.24 (±2.76) F(2, 94) = 0.79 0.46
MASQ: AD 49.56 (±10.90) 50.15 (±10.15) 49.26 (±11.32) F(2, 94) = 0.06 0.94
Perceived stress scale 19.67 (±6.33) 21.65 (±5.12) 19.71 (±6.45) F(2, 94) = 1.18 0.31
TEPS: anticipatory 64.67 (±6.68) 65.12 (±10.20) 64.18 (±9.46) F(2, 94) = 0.09 0.91
TEPS: consummatory 48.41 (±5.56) 50.82 (±6.04) 50.50 (±6.17) F(2, 94) = 1.41 0.25
BIS/BAS: reward
responsiveness
7.48 (±1.67) 7.65 (±2.71) 7.38 (±1.50) F(2, 94) = 0.14 0.87
BIS/BAS: drive 9.19 (±1.96) 8.91 (±2.14) 9.21 (±2.14) F(2, 94) = 0.20 0.82
BIS/BAS: fun seeking 8.04 (±2.16) 7.82 (±2.36) 7.74 (±2.12) F(2, 94) = 0.14 0.87
BIS/BAS: inhibition 16.00 (±2.82) 15.15 (±2.81) 15.65 (±2.87) F(2, 94) = 0.70 0.50
BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; MASQ, Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; GDA, General Distress Anxious; GDD, General Distress Depressive; AA,
Anxious Arousal; AD, Anhedonic Depression; TEPS, Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale; BIS/BAS, Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales.
Paired t-tests indicated that negative affect increased signifi-
cantly from baseline to PSST in the “controllable stress” group
[t(33) = 2.76, p < 0.01] and the “uncontrollable stress” group
[t(33) = 3.50, p < 0.01], but not in the “no stress” group [t(26) =
0.62, p = 0.54]. At baseline, there were no group differences
in negative affect [F(2, 94) = 0.25, p = 0.78]. However, nega-
tive affect during the PSST was significantly different between
groups [F(2, 94) = 3.52, p = 0.03]. Follow-up t-tests revealed that
participants in both the “controllable stress” [t(59) = 2.02, p <
0.05] and “uncontrollable stress” [t(59) = 2.61, p = 0.01] groups
reported significantly higher negative affect than participants in
the “no-stress” group. However, again contrary to hypotheses, the
two stress groups did not differ in their levels of negative affect
during the PSST [t(66) = −0.85, p = 0.40].
State positive affect. The mixed ANOVA on PANAS-PA scores
revealed a main effect of Time [F(1, 92) = 18.37, p < 0.01]; the
Time × Group interaction [F(2, 92) = 1.50, p = 0.23] and the
Group main effect [F(2, 92) = 1.05, p = 0.36] were not signifi-
cant. All participants reported a reduction in positive affect from
baseline to PSST.
Challenge-threat questionnaire. Contrary to hypotheses, the
“controllable stress” and “uncontrollable stress” groups were not
significantly different in their pre-task [t(42) = 0.37, p = 0.71]
or post-task [t(42) = 0.28, p = 0.78] threat appraisals. Moreover,
the two stress groups did not differ in their ratings of control
over performance in the task prior to task onset [t(42) = −0.03,
p = 0.98] or after completing the task [t(42) = 0.33, p = 0.74]. In
both groups and at both assessments, these ratings were close to
“neutral” but fell on the “disagree” side of the scale (<4) with
regard to having control over their performance.
A mixed ANOVA on ratings of perceived control over shock
with Group (Uncontrollable Stress, Controllable Stress) as a
between-subjects variable and Time (Pre-PSST, Post-PSST) as
a within-subjects variable revealed a trend for a Time × Group
interaction [F(1, 42) = 3.42, p = 0.07], with significant main
effects of Time [F(1, 42) = 29.60, p < 0.01] and Group [F(1, 42) =
45.64, p < 0.01]. On pre-task ratings of control over shock,
the “controllable stress” group was significantly higher than the
“uncontrollable stress” group [t(42) = 5.66, p < 0.01], as pre-
dicted; however, importantly and contrary to expectations, both
groups again fell in the “disagree” zone of the rating scale (<4).
A paired t-test within the “controllable stress” group indicated
that they reported significantly more control over the shock at
their post-task than pre-task rating [mean increased to 5.39 ±
1.62; t(22) = 5.51, p < 0.01]; interestingly, the “uncontrollable
stress” group also had a significant increase in level of perceived
control over shock frompre-task to post-task [2.43± 1.75; t(20) =
2.38, p = 0.03].
Overall, findings from the state measures indicated that
the “threat-of-shock” stress manipulation induced significantly
higher levels of negative affect and anxiety in both stress condi-
tions than the no-stress condition, but no significant differences
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between the two stress groups. Further indications that the stress
manipulation was only partially successful include the follow-
ing: no significant differences between the two stress groups on
pre-task threat appraisals or perceived control over general task
performance, and pre-task ratings of control over shock were in
the “disagree” zone of the scale for both groups.
Cortisol levels
The Time (T1 = baseline, T2 = post-“filler”-task/pre-PSST, T3
= post-PSST) × Group ANCOVA on cortisol levels, with “time
since waking” as a covariate, revealed only a significant main
effect of Time [F(2,176) = 11.37, p < 0.01]. Consistent with cor-
tisol’s diurnal pattern, cortisol levels dropped throughout the
experiment [linear effect: F(1, 88) = 15.14, p < 0.01]. Similarly,
an ANOVA comparing groups on cortisol reactivity scores at
T2-T1, and a separate ANOVA comparing groups on cortisol
reactivity scores at T3-T1, yielded insignificant findings (all F <
1.78, p > 0.17). The unpaired t-test comparing the “control-
lable stress” group with the “uncontrollable stress” group on
cortisol reactivity scores at T3-T1 was not significant [t(64) =
0.36, p = 0.72], suggesting that both stress conditions yielded
physiologically similar responses.
PSST training phase
Groups did not differ in the number of completed training blocks
[F(2, 94) = 0.49, p = 0.61]; all groups took approximately three
blocks to advance to the test phase (no-stress group: 3.15 ±
1.75; controllable stress group: 3.06 ± 1.50; uncontrollable stress
group: 3.44 ± 1.73). In the ANOVA for accuracy on the final
training block with Trial Type (AB, CD, EF) and Group as fac-
tors, there was only a main effect of Trial Type [F(2, 184) = 14.86,
p < 0.01; all other Fs < 1.30, ps > 0.30]; as expected, par-
ticipants were most accurate on the AB trial type and least
accurate on the EF trial type. No significant differences emerged
from the ANOVA for RT on the final training block (all Fs
< 1.91, ps > 0.15). Altogether, these findings indicate that (1)
the probabilistic contingencies elicited the intended behavioral
effects, and (2) groups did not differ in performance during the
training phase.
PSST test phase
The ANOVA comparing accuracy on AB trials (the “easiest” trial
type) in the test phase with Group confirmed that there were
no significant group differences in terms of participants learning
the basic task [F(2, 94) = 0.62, p = 0.54]. For accuracy, contrary
to hypotheses, the Trial Type (“Choose A,” “Avoid B”) × Group
ANOVA revealed no significant effects (all Fs < 1.59, ps > 0.21).
For RT scores, the analogous Trial Type × Group ANOVA
yielded a significant main effect of Trial Type [F(1, 92) = 29.73,
p < 0.01] and a Trial Type × Group interaction [F(1, 92) = 4.56,
p = 0.01]. Follow-up analyses indicated no significant group
differences on “Choose-A” trials or “Avoid B” trials (all ps
> 0.058). Paired t-tests revealed that participants in the “no
stress” and “uncontrollable stress” groups were slower on their
“Avoid B” trials than their “Choose A” trials [no-stress group:
t(26) = 4.47, p < 0.01; uncontrollable stress group: t(33) = 4.49,
p < 0.01]. Participants in the “controllable stress” condition,
however, exhibited RTs that were not significantly different across
trial types [t(33) = 0.72, p = 0.48].
DISCUSSION
Inspired by non-human animal research documenting that
uncontrollable stressors may be potent triggers of anhedonic-
like behavior, we attempted to examine whether stressor
controllability moderates the relationship between stress and
reward processing dysfunction. Although the stress manipula-
tion did induce significantly higher levels of negative affect and
anxiety than the no-stress condition, the uncontrollable and con-
trollable stress manipulations elicited similar affective and corti-
sol responses, which was contrary to hypotheses. Notably, these
results echoed patterns with self-report measures indicating that
the “controllable stress” group did not actually believe they had
control over the stressor. Accordingly, due to an only partially
successful stress manipulation, conclusions could not be drawn
concerning the impact of perceived control over stress.
Contrary to expectations, the two stress groups (“controllable”
and “uncontrollable”) did not differ significantly from each other
in their levels of anxiety or negative affect. Cortisol reactivity anal-
yses similarly did not reveal differences between the “controllable
stress” and “uncontrollable stress” groups. Moreover, there were
no significant differences between the two stress groups on pre-
task threat appraisals (perceived demands/personal resources)
or perceived control over general task performance. Although
pre-task ratings of control over shock were higher in the “con-
trollable stress” group than the “uncontrollable stress” group,
both groups’ ratings fell in the “disagree” zone of the scale,
indicating that prior to task onset, subjects in the “control-
lable stress” group did not actually believe that they would
have control over the stressor. This lack of believability may
stem from the fact that participants in the “controllable stress”
group were told they would be able to “significantly reduce”
the likelihood of receiving shock by pressing down on the foot
pedal, but could not completely eliminate the possibility of
being shocked (i.e., they were not given “complete” control).
Task instructions were outlined this way because of concerns
that the latter set of instructions would not induce signifi-
cantly more stress than the no-stress condition. Collectively,
these data suggest that the stress manipulation was only par-
tially successful: significantly more negative affect and anxiety
was reported by participants in both stress groups relative to the
“no-stress” group, but the controllability manipulation was not
successful.
Results from this aspect of the experiment serve to highlight
key variables to consider in the design of future experiments.
For example, the importance of administering an assessment of
perceived control over stress prior to task onset and collecting
data on a physiological index of stress (e.g., cortisol levels) to
confirm the effects of any stress manipulation on participants.
Moreover, given that participants in our “controllable” stress con-
dition (who were told they had “partial” control over the stressor)
did not report truly believing they had control over the stressor,
future designs warrant including a “controllable stress” condi-
tion in which participants are given perceived full control over
the stressor.
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